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We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to
sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the
owner possesses private information about the buyers’ valuations of
the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism
design model. In an undominated perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
model the seller gives the object to the person who values the object
most, and receives a transfer payment from each potential buyer such
that all ex-ante expected rents are extracted from the buyers.
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1 Introduction
Consider the situation where the owner of some good is to design some mech-
anism for selling the good to one of several potential buyers. Assuming that
the potential buyers have private information about their valuations of the
good this leads us to the problem of optimal auction design. Though opti-
mal auction design has received a lot of attention in the economic literature
during the last two decades, the situation where the seller has some private
information about the buyers’ valuations of the object to be sold does not
seem to have been considered so far. But under some circumstances the
seller clearly does possess such private information.
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alyzed in this paper, Georg N¨ oldeke for helpful comments, and the Deutsche Forschungs-
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Address: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn,
Adenauerallee 24–42, D-53113 Bonn, GERMANY
E-mail: tisljar@wiwi.uni-bonn.de
1For example, consider the following variation of the classic Akerlof model
(c.f. Akerlof (1970)), where the owner of a used car wants to sell this car:
Assume that there are two potential buyers, an academic and a mechanic.
Moreover, assume that the car seems to be in good shape to both the aca-
demic and the mechanic, but there is a possibility that the car has some
damage which has to be ﬁxed soon. Whether or not the car has such a dam-
age is private information of the owner. If the car is undamaged, then it is
worth ¿9.000 to the mechanic and ¿10.000 to the academic (the academic
might rely more on a car). If the car turns out to be damaged, the repair
will cost the academic ¿3.000, whereas the mechanic can do it himself for
¿1.000. If the state of the car was common knowledge, the owner could sell
it for either ¿10.000 or ¿8.000. But given that this state is private infor-
mation of the owner, such a solution is unlikely as the owner would always
have an incentive to claim that the car is undamaged. So the question arises
what kind of trading mechanisms the informed owner can implement in such
a situation.
If some seller possessing private information wants to ﬁnd the best mech-
anism for selling her object, then this situation amounts to a mechanism
design problem for an informed principal. Milgrom and Weber (1982) have
compared ex-ante expected seller revenues for a few well-known auctions in a
model where the seller has some private information which is aﬃliated with
the bidders’ valuations of the object. Such a comparison can be carried out
without taking into account that the choice of a mechanism by the princi-
pal may reveal some of her private information. Furthermore, Milgrom and
Weber assume that the informed principal does not misrepresent her pri-
vate information. In our optimal mechanism design approach, on the other
hand, we have to allow for the possibility that the choice of a mechanism
reveals some private information as well as for the possibility that the seller
may misrepresent her private information. More precisely, we shall assume
that the seller is to select a trading mechanism within the following contract
proposal game: First, the principal (seller) obtains some private information
about the buyers’ valuations of the object to be sold, and then selects some
trading mechanism or contract (a game form). Next the agents (buyers) up-
date their prior beliefs about the principal’s type based on any information
revealed by the choice of mechanism, and decide whether or not to accept
this mechanism (“voluntary participation”). Finally, if the mechanism is
accepted, then the implied game is played by the principal and the agents.
Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) present some non-cooperative solution con-
cepts for general contract proposal games.1 We shall use for our analysis
an extension of the latter model to an arbitrary number of agents and to a
1The ﬁrst to analyze an informed principal mechanism design model was Myerson
(1983), but most of his solution concepts incorporate ideas of cooperative game theory.
2more general information structure provided by Tisljar (2002).2
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the common-value
mechanism design model for an informed seller to be analyzed. Moreover,
we review the solution concept to be utilized for this model. In Section 3
we solve our mechanism design model, and Section 4 concludes with a short
summary and with some comments on the connection of our optimal trading
design model to optimal auction design models.
2 The Model
Suppose the owner of an object – the seller or principal (indexed by i = 0) –
wants to sell this object to one of n potential buyers (the agents, indexed by
i = 1,...,n). The monetary value of the object for agent i is given by vi ∈ R,
and the monetary value of the object for the seller is v0 ∈ R. We assume
that vi = vi(t) depends on some t ∈ T for all i = 1,...,n (where T ⊆ R
is some countable set),3 and that t is private information of the seller. All
agents consider t to be some random variable with prior probabilities given
by πt ∈ [0,1] (t ∈ T) such that
P
t∈T πt = 1. Though the buyers’ valuations
are assumed to be private information of the seller, we assume that v0 is
common knowledge.4
Let αi = 1 if the object is sold to agent i, and αi = 0 otherwise (i =
1,...,n).5 Moreover, let pi ∈ R be the transfer paid by agent i to the
seller. Then the utilities derived from (α,p) = (α1,...,αn,p1,...,pn) (with












ui((α,p),t) = −pi + αivi(t) (i = 1,...,n).




that all possible transfer payments are bounded by some arbitrary number
greater than supt∈T, i=1,...,n |vi(t)| + |v0|, and that all players are expected
utility maximizers. Furthermore, assume that the seller and the buyers play
the following contract proposal game:
2Maskin and Tirole (1992) assume for their model that there is one agent only and
that the type set of the principal is ﬁnite.
3Allowing T ⊆ R to be some arbitrary Borel set would not change our analysis, but
then we would have to make use of certain measurability assumptions (see Tisljar (2002)).
4Although this assumption may seem rather artiﬁcial, it is not unusual in the economic
literature. In standard auction design models, for example, it is usually assumed that the
seller’s valuation of the object to be sold is common knowledge.
5The restriction to αi ∈ {0,1} (rather than αi ∈ [0,1]) is not essential, i.e. we could
also consider the sale of some divisible good.
31. Nature draws the seller’s type t ∈ T; t is revealed to the seller, but
all buyers only know the probability measure according to which t is
distributed.
2. The seller chooses some game form (a contract) specifying some action
spaces for the seller and for all buyers, and for each combination of
actions some (α,p), i.e. some transfer payments to be made to the
seller as well as some decision as to who is going to receive the seller’s
object.
3. The n buyers update their prior beliefs about the seller’s type based on
any information revealed by the selection of the game form, and then
simultaneously decide whether or not to play the associated game.
4. If all agents have accepted, then the game associated with the game
form proposed by the seller is played. Otherwise the seller keeps her
object and no transfer payments are made.
Each pure-strategy equilibrium of the contract proposal game has to specify
for each t ∈ T some game form to be selected by the seller, as well as some
outcome for the implied game (if the game form is accepted; otherwise the
seller and the buyers settle with the status quo (α,p) = (0,0)). Hence, each
pure-strategy equilibrium implements some allocation rule
(α,p) : T → {(α1,...,αn) ∈ {0,1}n | α1 + ... + αn ≤ 1} × Rn.
The following deﬁnition concerning allocation rules will turn out helpful for
the characterization of equilibria of the contract proposal game:
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation rule (α,p) is































v0 ≥ v0 ∀ t ∈ T,






πtpi(t) (i = 1,...,n), and
4￿ not strictly dominated for the seller at τ ∈ T (NDτ), if there does not
exist any incentive-compatible allocation rule (e α, e p) such that






















The deﬁnitions of incentive-compatibility and (ex-ante) individual rational-
ity are standard. Strict dominance for the seller is deﬁned in terms of the
seller’s utility, only; as far as the buyers are concerned, some incentive-
compatible allocation rule which strictly dominates as deﬁned above is guar-
anteed to be strictly preferred to the status quo, but not necessarily strictly
preferred to the dominated allocation rule (for all t ∈ T).6
Tisljar (2002) demonstrates that all pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria (PBE) of the contract proposal game implement some allocation rule
which is incentive-compatible, individual rational for the seller, ex-ante in-
dividual rational for each agent, and not strictly dominated for the seller
at any t ∈ T.7 These conditions are due to a revelation and inscrutability
principle for the informed principal mechanism design model. The revela-
tion part of the theorem says that the seller can restrict herself to selecting
some direct revelation mechanism, i.e. some incentive-compatible allocation
rule. The inscrutability part implies that in a PBE all types of principal
may select the same incentive-compatible allocation rule. Hence, the choice
of this allocation rule does not reveal any of the principal’s private informa-
tion, and therefore the allocation rule has to be ex-ante individual rational
for the agents to be accepted. Moreover, the allocation rule has to be in-
dividual rational and not strictly dominated for the seller at any t ∈ T,
otherwise at least one type of principal would have an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium to the status quo or to some dominating allocation
rule, respectively.8
6Being not strictly dominated for the seller at any t ∈ T is closely related to being
a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation rule in the model of Maskin and Tirole (1992):
Both conditions ensure that the allocation rule under consideration yields the principal
at least as much utility as she could achieve by selecting any other allocation rule which
is guaranteed to be accepted by all agents regardless of how the agents update their prior
beliefs.
7To derive these necessary conditions Tisljar restricts his analysis to equilibria where
the mechanism selected by the principal is accepted by all agents (for all t ∈ T). Since
the principal can always secure herself the status quo by selecting a mechanism which
implements α = p = 0 irrespective of the players’ actions (and hence the principal need not
resort to mechanisms which are rejected), the restriction to equilibria “with acceptance”
is not severe.
8Though Tisljar (2002) proves that all pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium al-
location rules (“with acceptance”) have to be (IC), (IRS), (IRi) for all i, and (NDt) for
5Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that any equilibrium allocation rule
is undominated as deﬁned below:
Deﬁnition 2 An incentive-compatible allocation rule (α,p) is undominated
if there does not exist any allocation rule (e α, e p) which is (IC), (IRS), (IRi)




















v0 ∀ t ∈ T.
To see why, suppose that (α,p) is some allocation rule which is expected
to be implemented in an equilibrium of the contract proposal game, and
assume that (α,p) is dominated by some other equilibrium candidate (e α, e p)
as deﬁned above. Now the seller could select (e α, e p) instead of (α,p) and point
out to the agents that they should not infer anything from this deviation
from equilibrium play, as all types of seller strictly prefer (e α, e p) over (α,p).
If the agents follow this argument and do not update their prior beliefs, then
they should accept (e α, e p) as this yields them a non-negative expected utility
(since (e α, e p) is (IRi) for all i). But then (α,p) is an unlikely outcome of
the contract proposal game, because the seller can do better by announcing
(e α, e p).9
3 Undominated Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
In the previous section we have identiﬁed ﬁve conditions for an undominated
pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation rule for the contract
proposal game. In this section we demonstrate that there is an essentially
unique allocation rule satisfying all these conditions. To do so, we ﬁrst prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Each allocation rule which is incentive-compatible and ex-ante











irrespective of the seller’s type.
all t, he shows that these conditions are also suﬃcient for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
only for the case that mechanisms are restricted exogenously to incentive-compatible al-
location rules. But if the set of feasible mechanisms is more general, then any allocation
rule satisfying the necessary conditions above is implementable at least by some Bayesian
equilibrium of the contract proposal game (though not necessarily by a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium). Therefore, in the remainder of the paper we shall assume that any allocation
rule satisfying (IC), (IRS), (IRi) for all i, and (NDt) for all t can be implemented by the
seller.
9This reasoning follows an argument given in Myerson (1983).
































for all t ∈ T.




























































































since α1(t) + ... + αn(t) ≤ 1 for all t ∈ T. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 provides some upper bound on the utility the seller can obtain
in the contract proposal game. Next we shall show that this upper bound
can actually be achieved by the seller. To do so, let i∗(t) ∈ {1,...,n} for all








1 : i = i∗(t), vi(t) ≥ v0
0 : i 6= i∗(t) or vi(t) < v0




























i(s)vi(s) (i = 1,...,n).
So (α∗,p∗) speciﬁes that the seller’s object is given to some buyer who values
it most, unless the seller herself values the object even more (in which case
the seller keeps the object). Each buyer has to pay an amount to the seller
which only depends on whether or not the seller keeps the object herself
(but not on which buyer gets the object in case the seller does not keep it).















i=1 νi − v0(1 − Π) + v0 :
Pn
j=1 α∗
j(t) = 0 Pn
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8The following theorem shows that (α∗,p∗) satisﬁes all necessary conditions
for being a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation rule.
Theorem 1 The allocation rule (α∗,p∗) is (IC), (IRS), (IRi) for all i, and
(NDt) for all t ∈ T.
Proof: Since (α∗,p∗) is obviously (IC), (IRS), and (IRi) for all i, it remains
to show that (α∗,p∗) is not strictly dominated for the seller at any t ∈ T.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists some τ ∈ T and some incentive-
compatible allocation rule (e α, e p) such that



































With the help of Lemma 1 it easily follows that (α∗,p∗) is the essentially
unique undominated pure-strategy equilibrium allocation rule ((α∗,p∗) is
unique as far as the seller’s utility is concerned).
Corollary 1 (α∗,p∗) is an undominated allocation rule. Moreover, any
undominated pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation rule yields
the seller the same utility as (α∗,p∗).
Proof: Since any incentive-compatible allocation rule which is ex-ante in-








(c.f. Lemma 1), (α∗,p∗) is undominated.
Furthermore, consider some allocation rule which is (IC), (IRS), (IRi) for
all i, and (NDt) for all t ∈ T. By Lemma 1 this allocation rule does not
yield the seller more than
P
s∈T (πs maxj=1,...,n{vj(s),v0}). If the allocation
rule yields the seller less than
P
s∈T (πs maxj=1,...,n{vj(s),v0}), then it is
dominated by (α∗,p∗). Q.E.D.
9Note that (α∗,p∗) is eﬃcient. That the buyers do not receive any expected
rents should not be surprising, given that they do not have any private infor-
mation nor any bargaining power. What may be surprising, however, is the
fact that the seller’s utility is only E[maxi=1,...,n{vi,v0}], even if the seller
has some type t∗ such that
max
i=1,...,n
{vi(t∗),v0} > E[ max
i=1,...,n
{vi,v0}].
Under complete information a seller with such a type would clearly receive
a utility greater than E[maxi=1,...,n{vi,v0}]. The reason why (α∗,p∗) can be
supported as an equilibrium is the fact that it is impossible for the seller to
credibly reveal her private information (even if her type is indeed above
average), and this would be necessary to receive a utility of more than
E[maxi=1,...,n{vi,v0}]. In technical terms, the allocation rule the seller can
implement has to be incentive-compatible, and since the seller’s valuation of
her object is assumed to be common knowledge, each incentive-compatible
allocation rule yields the seller the same utility irrespective of her type. So
a seller of above average type is worse oﬀ due to the fact that the buyers’
valuations are her private information, whereas a seller of below average
type beneﬁts from the presence of private information.
Finally, let us review the Akerlof model described in the introduction. If
we assume that the car as such is worthless for the seller (she might have
lost her driving licence) and if we apply the solution (α∗,p∗) of the contract
proposal game to this model, then this yields the following outcome: If
the car is undamaged, then it is given to the academic (who values it at
¿10.000), otherwise it is given to the mechanic (who has a valuation of
¿8.000 for the damaged car). This is the same outcome as in the common
knowledge scenario. However, if the type of the car is private information
of the seller, then both the academic and the mechanic have to pay – the
academic ¿10.000 times the prior probability that the car is undamaged,
the mechanic ¿8.000 times the prior probability that the car is damaged
(for this result it is obviously essential that the buyers are not risk-averse).
4 Conclusion
This paper considers an optimal trading design model for an informed seller.
We have shown that in an undominated pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of the implied contract proposal game the seller gives the object to
the person who values the object most (unless the seller values the object
even more, in which case she keeps it), and receives a transfer payment from
each potential buyer such that all ex-ante expected rents are extracted from
the buyers.
Though the optimal trading design model is interesting in its own right, it
can also be considered as a ﬁrst step in analyzing optimal auction design
10models with two-sided incomplete information. In optimal auction design
models it is usually assumed that the bidders possess some private infor-
mation about their valuations of the object to be sold, whereas the seller
does not have any such private information. Though this assumption may
be appropriate for some auction design settings, and it may serve as a useful
ﬁrst approximation to the true information structure in other situations, in
general we might expect that the seller as well as a bidder possesses some
private information about a bidder’s valuation. If, for example, some piece
of art is to be sold, some auction house is typically in a better position than
any of the bidders to estimate the resale value of the item. Therefore, the
standard auction design literature considers only one polar case of the more
general information structure, whereas our optimal trading design model
analyzes the other polar case (where only the seller possesses some private
information). An obvious next step is to consider an auction model with
two-sided incomplete information.
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